Earnings quality and crash risk in China: an integrated analysis by Wongchoti, U & Hao, W
Earnings quality and crash risk in
China: an integrated analysis
Udomsak Wongchoti
School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Manawatu Campus,
Palmerston North, New Zealand
Ge Tian
Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, Shanghai Jiao Tong University,
Shanghai, China
Wei Hao
School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Wellington Campus,
Wellington, New Zealand
Yi Ding
University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, and
Hongfeng Zhou
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China
Abstract
Purpose – The authors provide a comprehensive empirical examination on the impact of earnings quality on
stock price crash risk in China.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors acknowledge and distinguish two-dimensional proxies for
earnings quality – accounting-based (earningsmanagement degree) andmarket-based (earnings transparency)
known in accounting and finance literature.
Findings – The authors find that both generally indicate that better earnings quality is associated with less
crashes. However, extremely high earnings transparency interacted with insider trading profit can also
actually exacerbate stock price crashes.
Originality/value –This study is the first to highlight the pertinence of accounting-basedmeasures to proxy
for earnings quality in a fast-growing emerging market environment such as China.
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1. Introduction
The stock market crash in China started on 12th June 2015 and lasted until early February
2016 and has caused its market capitalization to reduce by one-third in a short period of time.
This has received tremendous amount of coverages from media and news around the world.
Although it is unclear about the main cause of the crash, it has been largely agreed among all
market participants that paying more careful attention to listed companies’ fundamentals is
one way to improve sustainability in the Chinese stock market going forward.
One of the primary pieces of information that investors can observe regarding a firm’s
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pay more attention to earnings information than other indicators such as dividends, cash flow
and others. Nevertheless, finance literature suggests that selective information disclosure by
insiders can still lead to misleading earnings numbers and thus the stock price crash in time.
Hutton et al. (2009), among others, show thatUS companieswith poor financial disclosure tend to
display lower information transparency (e.g. higher stock price synchronicity or R2). This, in
turn, increases the probability of stock price crashes for them. In other words, the worse the
earnings quality, the higher the stock price crash risk. Whether this phenomenon can be
generalized to an emerging market such as China is an important empirical question. There are
only few empirical studies examining stock price crash risk in China. The focus, however, has
been on factors such as excess perks, social trust (region based), internal control and others (see,
e.g. Xu et al. (2014); Li et al. (2017); andChen et al. (2017)). To the best of our knowledge, there is no
comprehensive study that formally examines the impact of earnings quality on stock price crash
risk in China. We expect to find a negative relation between earnings quality and crash risk in
China. As suggested byHutton et al. (2009), managers from firmswith poor earnings quality are
more likely to hide firm-specific information (in particular, unfavorable information). When the
information cannot be withheld anymore, the information will be released to the market all at
once, causing the firms to face a higher probability of extreme outcomes.
Researchers acknowledge two main aspects in constructing the measures of earnings
quality. The first one is “earnings management degree.” It verifies whether earnings are
measured and disclosed in accordance with the provisions of the accounting guidelines. In
other words, it directly addresses whether the reported earnings number is manipulated with
subjective judgment by management. The other one is “earnings transparency.” This latter
method is also called the value relevance level of earnings information as it observes the
linkage between reported earnings information and stock returns. It also reflects investor’s
trust in the earnings information announced to the public. Theoretically, both measures are
important in reflecting the quality of a company’s earnings. However, whether these
approaches/metrics are appropriate in predicting stock price crashes in an emerging financial
market, such as China, remains an open question.
The impact of earnings quality on stock price crashes in China is particularly important to
investigate. While the growing importance/potential of Chinese stocks in international portfolio
context is evident, China’s trading environment still experiences problems as would any
financial market in the immature stage. Deeper knowledge of the stock market price movement
dynamics (especially around its extreme downturns) provides investors with protection that is
more sustainable than relying on occasional interventions from the authority [1].
Studying all valid A-share listed sample companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen
(largely perceived as China’s Nasdaq) exchanges during the 2006–2013 period, we find that
earnings quality decreases stock price crash risk in China. This finding is consistent for both
earnings manipulation (estimation of earnings management degree through discretionary
accruals as per the modified Jones (1991) model) and earnings transparency (explanatory
power of earnings numbers on stock returns as per Barth et al. (2013) model) metrics.
Specifically, our results uncover a positive relation between earnings management degree
and crash risk and a negative relation between earnings transparency and crash risk.
While the aforementioned results appear to be largely consistent with previous studies in
developed markets, we find that earnings transparency may not be a reliable indicator of
earnings quality in the Chinese context [2]. Several studies point to the severity of agency
problems among Chinese corporations. For example, Xu et al. (2014) show that perk (fringe
benefits) consumptions among Chinese managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in
conjunction with earnings management, significantly increase stock price crash risk. Cao
et al. (2016) find that lack of social trust is a determinant of crash risk in low social trust
provinces in China: firms in provinces with lower social trust are more likely to hide bad news
and thus experience higher crash risk. Zhang andNam (2016) note that excessive information
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transparency in China can actually lead to higher stock price crash risk. In other words, as an
“indirect” earnings quality indicator from the information user’s perspective rather than the
accounting data itself, high earnings transparency could also indicate the insufficiency of
nonearnings information in the public. For example, it is possible that insiders, knowing that
individual investors follow their released earnings numbers blindly, manipulate stock prices
for their own personal benefits. This leads to a seemingly high earnings transparency that
actually does not reflect the true prospects of a firm in a timely manner. Higher crash risk
follows ultimately as a result. To explore this possibility, we investigate the impact of extreme
earnings transparency on crash risks conditional on high insider trading profit. Our findings
confirm this conjecture. Specifically, crash risk increaseswith extreme earnings transparency
when interacted with the intensity of insiders’ profits.
Our research contributes to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, despite China’s
increasingly prominent role in the global stock markets, existing literature of stock price
crash risk in Chinese stock market is sparse. We add to the existing literature by establishing
the relation between earnings quality and crash risk in China. Secondly, our findings indicate
that earnings management and earning transparency are not completely interchangeable in
measuring earnings quality in an emerging market such as China. Contrary to the prior
studies of developed markets, our results suggest that high earnings transparency is not
necessarily associated with better earnings quality and lower crash risk. Extremely high
earnings transparency can exacerbate the crash risk among Chinese firms. This is an
important finding to future researchers as it indicates that caution should be exercised when
measuring earnings quality by earnings transparency in the Chinese context.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and methodology, and Section 4
presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1 Two dimensions of earnings quality measures
Researchers in finance and accounting have classified earnings quality measures into two
broad types of metrics, the degree of earnings management and earnings transparency.
Earnings management measures are mainly based on the accrued total profit method
designed to reflect the various accrued profit manipulation behaviors of listed companies.
Healy (1985) first divides the accruals in the report into parts that can be manipulated and
cannot be manipulated. Because the earnings are equal to the accrued items amount plus the
cash flow of operating activities (CFO), the degree to which the measurable items are
manipulated can reflect the quality of the reported earnings numbers. Expanding on this
principle, Jones (1991) obtains nondiscretionary earnings by calculating the amount of
earnings corresponding to the nondiscretionary items. Dechow et al. (1995) later consider the
impact of accounts receivable on total sales when measuring nondiscretionary accruals and
propose the famous modified Jones model.
Other literature argues that a better measure of earnings quality should state how
reported earnings numbers are captured by investors in the stock market, which is known as
the earnings transparency. Barth (2003) formally examines earnings transparency as the
explanatory power of earnings to changes in the company’s economic value. Francis et al.
(2004) construct a regression model with current earnings, current earnings changes and
stock returns. The R2 from these regression models is used as a proxy for earnings
transparency. The larger the R2 value obtained by the regression, the higher the earnings
transparency (and thus better earnings quality). In a similar vein, Barth et al. (2013) develop a
more rigorous and popular model using R2 from the regression of the earnings and stock
returns as the explanatory power of earnings information to the company’s value (the extent





2.2 Earnings quality and stock price crash risk
The undesirable stock price crash happens when the following characteristics appear for a
certain stock. First, the stock price volatility is excess and unpredictable without supports
from formal information regarding firms’ fundamentals available in the public. Second, the
probability of negative stock volatility is disproportionally greater than the probability of
positive volatility (asymmetric tendency of losses in the investment). In the worst scenario,
the risk of individual stock price crash may spread to the entire capital market (Hong and
Stein, 2003) as observed in the midyear of 2015 for the Chinese stock market.
Regarding stock price crash risk metrics, Chen et al. (2001) employ Negative Coefficient of
Skewness (NCSKEW) and Down-to-Up Volatility (DUVOL) as proxies of stock price collapse
risk. Building on the work of Chen et al. (2001); Kim et al. (2011a, b); Kim et al. (2014); Kim and
Zhang (2014) and Xu et al. (2014), improve the method by replacing Ri,t with Wi,t and
calculating the values of NCSKEWandDUVOL. Hutton et al. (2009), on the other hand, define
“Crash” as a binary variable. It is 1 if the stock encounters at least one stock crash in the year;
and 0 otherwise. The definition of the stock price collapseweek is defined as the stock-specific
weekly yield (Wi,t) of the week less than the mean value of the stock’s specific weekly yield
minus 3.09 times the standard deviation. In the normal distribution, 3.09 standard deviations
are at the 0.1% boundary of the entire distribution, where the stock returns are extremely
abnormal and the stock price collapse is likely to occur. Kim et al. (2011a, b) change the 3.09
standard deviation to 3.2 to obtain a more stringent stock price crash risk indicator.
In literature, earnings quality is one of the forefront factors proposed to explain the stock
price crash risk [3]. Hutton et al. (2009) study the role of opaque financial reporting on information
transparency (proxied by stock price synchronicity) and thus stock price crash risk. The results
show that if a company reduces the transparency in its financial reporting, the company’s related
news dissemination efficiencywill be low (e.g. higherR2). The lack of such price informativeness
causes the stock price to be overestimated. Over time, this leads to higher probability of stock
price crashes. Moreover, Kim et al. (2011b) and Benmelech et al. (2010) argue that CEOs have
incentives to hide bad news for the company’s long-term development. The rising stock prices
may lead to excessive overinvestment and overvaluation, leading to subsequent stock price
collapses. Studying a large sample of the US stocks from 1964 to 2007, Kim and Zhang (2016)
arrive at the same conclusion that the company’s accounting conservatism (e.g. less earnings
manipulation) is negatively correlatedwith future stock price crash risks. The findings aremore
prominent for firms withmore severe asymmetric information problem. Francis et al. (2016) find
that earnings management significantly increases the risk of stock price collapse as it is a
common means for insiders to maximize their self-interests. Using 2008 financial crisis as an
exogenous shock to the overall trust in the capital market, Da Silva (2019) documents that
precrisis earnings quality is an important determinant of abnormal crash risk.
Existing literature studying crash risk in China is limited. Xu et al. (2014) show that
Chinese SOEs with higher excess perks are more prone to stock price crashes during the
2003–2010 period. Executives in such SOEs withhold bad news to enhance their ability to
enjoy fringe benefits from the company. Focusing on five components of corporate internal
control, Chen et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence based on listed stocks in both Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2012. They find that poor internal control within
Chinese listed firms leads to higher probability of crashes. Going beyond the firm-level
characteristics/factors, Li and Cai (2016) document the desirable impact of religious
environment intensity on crash risk. Specifically, among Chinese listed A-share companies
during the 2003–2013 study period, firms that are registered in locations closer to religious
activities sites (through Google Earth) experience less stock price crash. In the same vein, Li
et al. (2017) report that Chinese firms that are headquartered in regions (provincial and city
level) of high social trust experience less stock price crash. Also, this finding is stronger
among firms with greater state ownership, weaker monitoring and higher risk taking.
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Interestingly, all of the aforementioned studies use earnings quality as the underlying
channel/mechanism through which their proposed explanatory variables could affect stock
price crash risk. In other words, all of the aforementioned studies make an implicit
assumption that lower earnings quality (exacerbated by agency issues within Chinese
companies) increases stock price crash risk without formally establishing such relation.
Based on the earlier discussion, we propose the following hypotheses:
H1. Chinese firms with higher degree of earnings management are associated with
higher stock crash risk
H2. Chinese firms with higher earnings transparency are associated with lower
crash risk
3. Data and methodology
Our study covers all Chinese A-share listed companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges from 2006 to 2013. Same as previous studies that examine stock price crash risk in
China, we end our sample period before 2015 to avoid possible irrationalities that took place in
the year of the systematic crash. The stock return data, company financial data and insider
trading data are all retrieved from the CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting
Research) database.
Our sample companies are selected following Chen et al. (2001); Hutton et al. (2009) and
Barth et al. (2013). Final sample consists of 1,964 companies. Key variables are winsorized at
1% top and bottom.
3.1 Earnings management measure
We draw on the relevant literature as discussed in the previous section and select “the
modified Jones model” to estimate the discretionary accruals to measure the company’s
earnings management degree. The following regression is conducted in each industry to
estimate the relevant regression coefficients β1; β2; β3:
TAi;t
Ai;t−1
















TAi;t is the total accrued profit of the company i in year t, which is the difference between the
net profit after tax and the cash flow from operating activities;ΔREVi;t is the difference of the
operating income between the year t and year t1 of company i; PPEi;t is the total fixed assets
of the company in year t; Ai;t−1 is the total assets of the company i in year t.
Once the regression coefficients (β1; β2; β3Þ are obtained from the aforementioned regression
model (1), we then calculate the company’s discretionary accruals (DAi;t) using the following
model (2). Notice that β1ð1=Ai;t−1Þ þ β2ðΔREVi;t −ΔRECi;t=Ai;t−1Þ þ β3ðPPEi;t=Ai;t−1Þ is the
modified Jones model following Huttlon et al. (2009) and Dechow et al. (1995), which
represents nondiscretionary accruals. The inclusion of ΔRECi;t is the modification of
Jones model.ΔRECi;t is the company’s accounts receivable changes between year t and t-1.


























Following Huttlon et al. (2009), the sum of three lag periods absolute discretionary accruals is
finally used to measure the degree of accrued earnings management.
AMAccuruali;t ¼
DAi;tþ DAi;t−1þ DAi;t−2 (3)
According to the aforementioned, the greater the AMAccurual, the more likely the company is
engaged in earnings management activities (e.g. the lower the earnings quality).
3.2 Earnings transparency measure
To measure earnings transparency, we employ the comprehensive approach introduced by
Barth et al. (2013) to test our hypothesis. In a nutshell, the measure quantifies the explanatory
power of current earnings (and the change of current earnings) on the observed stock returns
for a certain firm in a certain year while taking into account the influences of the industry.
It is a two-step method. The first step is to regress the annual stock return of a company in
a particular industry on price-scaled annual earnings (and price-scaled change in earnings) as
stated in the following equation. In doing so, we have to firstly classify all the sample
companies according to the industry (17 of them according to the CSRC (China Securities
Regulatory Commission) industry classification in CSMAR database) and construct the
industry portfolio. The idea here is to capture the commonality of accounting applications in
the industry and thus reflect the heterogeneity between different industries.
The regression is carried out on yearly basis. The adjusted R2 (one number for each
industry each year) estimates obtained from such regressions serve as the transparency
measure of the industry earnings, namely ETRANSi;j;t.











RETURNi;j;t is the annualized rate of return of the industry j company i (annualized rate of
return calculated from the weekly return data of year t)
Ei;j;t is the net profit of the industry j company i after deducting nonrecurring profit and
loss (we use the operating profit data in the income statement)
ΔEi;j;t is the net profit change after deducting nonrecurring gains and losses in industry j
company i, using t year operating profit minus t1 year operating profit
Pi;j;t is the year-end market value in year t1 in industry j (the market value at the
beginning of year t)
εi;j;t is the return residual of the industry j in year t
The second step is to account for the degree of earnings transparency beyond the industry
influence. Based on the “residuals” obtained from the first regression (4), the companies in each
industry are sorted from smallest to largest in each year. The quartile cutoffs of the residuals are
calculated and used as the benchmark to divide sample companies in each year into four groups
[4]. We then combine the top 25% of each industry in the year to construct a combined
“portfolio.” Finally, adjusted R2 from the regression of (5) is ETRANSi;p;t. It represents the
earnings transparency level based on the “portfolio” rankings free of the industry effect.











RETURNi;p;t is the annualized rate of return of the portfolio p company i (annualized rate of
return calculated from the weekly return data of year t)
Ei;p;t is the net profit of the portfolio p company i after deducting nonrecurring profit and
loss (We use the operating profit data in the income statement)
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ΔEi;p;t is the net profit change after deducting nonrecurring gains and losses in portfolio p
company i, using t year operating profit minus t1 year operating profit
Pi;p;t is the year-end market value in year t1 in portfolio p (the market value at the
beginning of the year t)
εi;p;t is the return residual of the portfolio p in year t
The second step is performed to capture the explanatory power of earnings numbers on
stock returns outside the industry influence. As argued by Barth et al. (2013), since each
combination of stocks in each “portfolio” covers all industries, it effectively eliminates the
influence of the industry. Therefore, changes in R2 cannot be attributed to changes in
industry, but instead reflect differences in explanatory power induced by certain
characteristics of a firm in the portfolio it belongs to.
Finally, the earnings transparency degree of each firm in each year, ETRANSi;t, is
calculated from the combination of the aforementioned two steps.
ETRANSi;t ¼ ETRANSi;p;t þ ETRANSi;j;t (6)
ETRANSi;t is the earnings transparency of company i in year t
ETRANSi;j;t is the earning transparency of industry j in year t
ETRANSi;p;t is earnings transparency of portfolio p (exclude industry effect)
3.3 Stock price crash risk measure
Three proxies of stock price crash risk are prominent in financial research (see, e.g. Jin and
Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a, b, among others). They are the negative
return skewness coefficient (NCSKEW) measure, DUVOL measure and a binary CRASH
likelihood measure. Among the three, NCSKEW and DUVOL are closer in their construction.
In this study, we use NCSKEW and CRASH as the primary measures of crash risk and
DUVOL for robustness check.
We first carry out the following regression:
ri;d ¼ αþ β1rj;d−1 þ β2rm;d−1 þ β3ri;d þ β4rm;d þ β5rj;dþ1 þ β6rm;dþ1 þ ei;d (7)
ri,d is the weekly return of the company i in the week dwithout considering the cash dividend
reinvestment; rm,d is the weekly market return in week d without considering the cash
dividend reinvestment; rj,d is the value-weighted return of industry j that company i belongs
to in week d. The residual εi,d is the degree to which the company’s stock return deviates from
the market weekly yield, indicating that the weekly stock return cannot be explained by the
fluctuation of the market weekly yield. We set Ri;d ¼ lnð1þ ei;dÞ.
Based on aforementioned “return”metrics, we construct the following three indicators of
stock price crash risk on the “firm-year” basis:
(1) CRASH (Hutton et al. (2009); Kim et al. (2011a, b))
The crash week is identified when Ri,d is lower than Ri,d subtracted by 3.2 times the standard
deviation of the t-year average Ri,d. For the company i in year t, if there is at least one crash
week, then CRASHi,t is 1, 0 otherwise.








A,ðn 1Þðn 2ÞXR2i;d32 (8)
where n is the number of trading weeks for company i in year t. The skewness coefficient





negative bias coefficient of the company’s stock return, which means that the risk of stock
price collapse is higher.














With this procedure, we divide the weekly yield of the stock during year t into two groups:
higher than average yield (up weeks) and lower than average yield (down weeks). nupðndownÞ
is the number of weeks of “up” weeks (“down” weeks) group. DUVOL [5] is the annual stock
volatility. The larger the DUVOL, the higher the volatility, the higher the stock crash risk.
3.4 Control variables
We control for variables that are known in the literature as determinants of stock price crash
risk (see, e.g. Chen et al. (2001); Hutton et al. (2009); Kim et al. (2011a, b); Xu et al. (2014), among
others). For themain control variables, previous research shows that there is a strong positive
correlation between detrended stock turnover (DTURN), market volatility (SIGMA), market
return (RETURN), stock price crash risk (NCSKEW) and the company’s stock price crash risk
in the coming year. DTURN controls for the heterogeneity of investors. Specifically, it is the
monthly average turnover rate in the year t minus the monthly average turnover rate in year
t1. SIGMA is the standard deviation of the firm’s weekly specific rate of return while
RETURN is the firm specific buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year period.
In addition, we also control for the “more generic” firm-specific characteristics, including
company size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB), financial leverage (LEV) and return to asset
(ROA). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets in the year t; MB is the sum of the
market value of the outstanding shares plus the book value of the nontradable shares divided
by the book value of the equity; LEV is the ratio of assets to liabilities; ROA is the ratio of the
profit before interest and taxes to the total assets at the beginning of the year.
Another important variable used in our study to scrutinize the relation between stock price
crash risk and earnings transparency further is “insider trading profit.” It considers the impact
amount, frequency and number of insider transactions and thus proxies for the extent of private
benefit enjoyed by insiders of a particular firm. Following themethodology of Skaife et al. (2013),





ðABRETi;t;j*VALUEbought i;t;j  ABRETi;t;j*VALUEsold i;t;jÞ; 0
MVi;t−1
(10)
ABRETi;t;j is the one-year-hold excess return rate for the insider transaction in week t. n
represents the number of weeks after the transaction. This paper uses the one-year trading
window period (47 weeks). VALUEbought i;t;j and VALUEsold i;t;j are the insider buy amount and
the insider sales amount, respectively.MVi;t−1 is themarket value of company i at the beginning
of year t.
3.5 Regression model
To test whether there is a relation between earnings quality and stock price crash risk in
China, we employ the following multivariate regression to test our hypotheses. We use




NCSKEWi;tþ1 ¼ β0 þ β1ETRANSi;t þ β2AMAccuruali;t þ β3INSIRETURNi;t þ β4MBi;t
þ β5SIGMAi;t þ β6LEVi;t þ β7ROAi;t þ β8SIZEi;t þ β9DTURNi;t
þ β10RETURNi;t þ εi;t
(11)
Based on our hypotheses, we expect β1 to be negative and β2 to be positive.
4. Empirical results
We start the empirical section by reporting the summary statistics of all variables mentioned
in Section 3 in our sample after data screening in Table 1. Overall, the reasonably close
proximity of mean and median numbers across variables suggests that our sample data does
not have serious abnormality problem.
Table 2 reports the extent of stock price crash risk observed in our sample. We show both
the annual crash probability and the average NCSKEW broken down in calendar years.
During our sample period between 2006 and 2013, stock price crash probability is the highest
in 2010 and the lowest in 2008. The average yearly NCSKEW and the average crash




observations Mean S.D. Min 0.250 Mdn 0.750 Max
NCSKEWi;tþ1 11,030 0.240 0.790 2.610 0.680 0.050 0.140 1.830
CRASH 11,030 0.0900 0.290 0 0 0 0 1
ETRANS 11,030 0.300 0.240 0.170 0.130 0.250 0.410 1.120
AMAccurual 11,030 1.450 0.690 3.240 1.890 1.440 1 0.390
NCSKEWi;t 11,030 0.190 0.790 2.440 0.650 0.040 0.200 1.950
MB 11,030 3.550 3.780 5.240 1.590 2.560 4.280 25.94
SIGMA 11,030 0.050 0.020 0.020 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.100
LEV 11,030 52.99 22.83 7.520 37.46 53.04 67 147.9
ROA 11,030 3.600 6.850 25.12 1.040 3.210 6.360 25.17
RETURN 11,030 0.070 0.280 0.750 0.250 0.080 0.100 0.680
DTURN 11,030 9.710 354.2 918.5 211.2 8.230 204.6 882.6
SIZE 11,030 15 1.330 12.07 14.10 14.86 15.74 19.42












2006 1,133 80 1,053 7.1% 0.1485
2007 1,191 104 1,087 8.7% 0.1080
2008 1,200 83 1,117 6.9% 0.3719
2009 1,289 107 1,182 8.3% 0.2806
2010 1,399 191 1,208 13.7% 0.0530
2011 1,469 163 1,306 11.1% 0.2246
2012 1,570 119 1,451 7.6% 0.3232










4.1 Earnings management degree and crash risk in China
We run the regression equation mentioned in Section 3.5 to formally test Hypothesis 1 that
higher earningsmanagement degree is associated with higher stock price crash risk in China.
As a preliminary test, correlation analysis is presented in Table 3. Overall, the table shows no
serious multicollinearity in the regression model [6].
Table 4 reports the OLS regression results of the impact of earnings management degree
ðAMAccruali;tÞ on the stock price crash risk. Column (1) is the result of mixed regression with
NCSKEW as the dependent variable while column (2) is the result of mixed regression with
CRASH as the dependent variable. Supporting Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of AMAccruali;t is
significantly positive at the levels of 1 and 5% for NCSKEW and CRASH, respectively. The
higher the degree of earnings management, the greater the crash risk, consistent with the
findings documented in Hutton et al. (2009). Our results are also robust with the inclusion of
the year fixed effect [7].
4.2 Earnings transparency and crash risk in China
Unlike earnings management measure, earnings transparency has never been linked in any
way to stock price crash risk in China so far, perhaps due to its complexity. We start this
section by describing the dynamics of earnings transparency estimated using our sample.
Figure 1 shows the eight-year average adjusted R2 generated by industry when calculating
ETRANSi;j;t. It indicates variations of the average ETRANSi;j;t measures across industries.
The industries with top overall earnings transparency are scientific research and technical
service, health and social work and real estate. Industries with lowest earnings transparency
are leasing and business services, electric heating gas and water production and supply.
Figure 2(a) shows the trend of annual average earnings transparency by its components
over time. The overall earnings transparency is maintained at 15–20% level. Specifically, the
overall earnings transparency in 2008 and 2011 is above average. By depicting Figure 2(b)
(Shanghai Composite Index from 2006 to 2014), it is observable that the two years of
significant increase in earnings transparency occurred mainly after the two bull markets in
2007 and 2010.
Finally, Table 5 provides the regression results on the impact of earnings transparency on
stock price crash risk. Hypothesis 2 predicts that higher transparency leads to lower risk in
stock price crash. The reported results are largely consistent with such prediction. Regression
coefficients reported in columns (1) and (2) present mixed results for all industries and all
years. Regression coefficients in columns (3) and (4) show the results while including the year
fixed effect. The hypothesized negative coefficients of ETRANSi;t are observable and
statistically significant across all four models. If the year fixed effect is considered, one unit
change in ETRANSi;t is associated with lower stock price crash risk of 0.721 (in terms of
negative skewness) and0.0381 (in terms of probability of at least one week crash during the
year), respectively.
4.3 A closer look on the impact of earnings transparency on crash risk
The empirical design of earnings transparency suggests that the higher the explanatory
power of earnings variation on stock return variation, the higher is the earnings quality. But it
is also possible that too much reliance on reported earning numbers could indicate lack of
other nonearnings-based information available to stock investors. In such scenario, the
insiders of the company with higher agency issues would be even more motivated to send
false signals to the stock market through misleading earnings numbers (and thus lower
earnings quality). This phenomenon can be quite crucial in an inefficient market with large



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In 2006, China promulgated relevant laws and regulations, allowing insiders to buy and sell
stocks of their own companies under certain conditions. Figure 3 shows that China’s insider
trading behavior has increased over the years. The number of insider transactions started
from 497 in 2006 and increased to 8,987 in 2014. Trading approaches range from auction
bidding transactions (accounting for 64%) to secondarymarket trading (accounting for 21%)
as shown in Figures 3(a) and (b). All these findings point to the ever-present insiders and their
exploitive behaviors in China. Themore their trading activities, the more likely their reported
earnings numbers to mislead investors (and subsequent crashes that could follow). Numbers
reported in Table 3 support this conjecture. The variable, insider trading profit ðINSIRETURNÞ
is positively related to NCSKEWtþ1 at 1% significance level, indicating that if insiders
generate positive trading profit in year t, then the stock crash risk would increase in year tþ1.
As discussed previously, high earnings transparency may not necessarily indicate better
earnings quality, especially in the case of extreme reliance on reported earnings numbers (which
could come from opportunistic insiders having learned that investors rely on their released
earnings numbers only). While we show in the previous section that earnings transparency
reduces stock price crash risk in general, it may not be the case when the transparencymeasure
shows extreme numbers. This is especially true in the presence of insider trading.
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NCSKEWi;tþ1 CRASHi;tþ1 NCSKEWi;tþ1 CRASHi;tþ1
AMAccurual i;t 0.0337*** (0.011) 0.0097** (0.004) 0.0354*** (0.011) 0.0098** (0.004)
NCSKEWi;t=RASHi;t 0.0525*** (0.011) 0.0008 (0.004) 0.0498*** (0.011) 0.0001 (0.004)
MBi,t 0.0167*** (0.002) 0.0033*** (0.001) 0.0139*** (0.002) 0.0026*** (0.001)
SIGMAi,t 1.890*** (0.535) 0.932*** (0.198) 2.476*** (0.632) 1.077*** (0.234)
LEVi,t (10
–3) 0.0003 (0.350) 0.0002 (0.129) 0.0001 (0.349) 0.0002* (0.129)
ROAi,t (10
–3) (10–3) 0.29** (0.113) 0.0021 (0.042) 0.30*** (0.112) 0.0023 (0.042)
RETURNi,t 0.317*** (0.032) 0.0297** (0.012) 0.353*** (0.033) 0.0244** (0.012)
DTURNi,t (10
–4) (10–4) 0.157 (0.216) 0.0745 (0.080) 0.468 (0.302) 0.0704 (0.112)
SIZEi,t 0.0139** (0.007) 0.0031 (0.002) 0.0172** (0.007) 0.0019 (0.002)
Year dummy No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.532*** (0.113) 0.0828** (0.042) 0.779*** (0.121) 0.103** (0.045)
Observations 11,030 11,030 11,030 11,030
R-squared 0.024 0.006 0.039 0.009
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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To investigate the aforementioned point, we calculate the crash probability for the four
earnings transparency levels based on CRASH variable we created from the previous section.
Such crash probability is calculated as the total number of crashed companies between 2006
and 2013 divided by the total number of listed companies in a particular earnings
transparency level. As seen in Figure 4(a), the earnings transparency is steadily decreasing as
the earnings transparency levels increase. However, if we look closer into the high
transparency group alone and further divide this high transparency group into another four
levels, the opposite pattern emerges. As reported in Figure 4(b), the crash probability
generally increases as the earnings transparency increases.
To formally confirm the aforementioned, we rerun the regression presented in Table 5 but
limit our sample to the high earnings transparency group (top 25%) only. The results suggest
no significant relation between earnings transparency and stock price crash risk in this
subsample [8]. In other words, an extremely high earnings transparency does not guarantee
lower crash risk. The high earnings transparency might, on the contrary, indicate the
insufficiency of nonearnings information, which in turn leads to higher crash risk.
As explained earlier, the disappearing effect of earnings transparency in reducing stock
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
NCSKEWi;tþ1 CRASHi;tþ1 NCSKEWi;tþ1 CRASHi;tþ1
ETRANSi;t 0.130*** (0.031) 0.0447*** (0.012) 0.0721** (0.036) 0.0381*** (0.013)
NCSKEWi;t 0.0577*** (0.011) 0.0025 (0.004) 0.0521*** (0.011) 0.0009 (0.004)
MBi,t (10
–2) 0.0165*** (0.214) 0.0032*** (0.079) 0.0144*** (0.222) 0.0028*** (0.082)
SIGMAi,t 2.196*** (0.536) 0.833*** (0.198) 2.663*** (0.630) 1.022*** (0.233)
LEVi,t (10
–2) (10–3) 0.0415 (0.345) 0.0246* (0.127) 0.0263 (0.345) 0.0260** (0.128)
ROAi,t (10
–2) (10–3) 0.0290** (0.113) 0.0003 (0.042) 0.0306*** (0.112) 0.0001 (0.042)
RETURNi,t 0.314*** (0.032) 0.0288** (0.012) 0.349*** (0.033) 0.0224* (0.012)
DTURNi,t (10
–3) (10–3) 0.0039 (0.022) 0.014* (0.008) 0.0504* (0.030) 0.0059 (0.011)
SIZEi,t 0.0129* (0.007) 0.0028 (0.002) 0.0166** (0.007) 0.0018 (0.003)
Year dummy No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.547*** (0.112) 0.0807* (0.041) 0.805*** (0.121) 0.104** (0.045)
Observations 11,030 11,030 11,030 11,030
R-squared 0.025 0.006 0.038 0.010
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Figure 3.









To verify this point, we employ INSIRETURNi;t variable to capture the managerial incentive.
According to the agency theory, to maximize the personal profits, management (insiders)
could benefit from its information advantage through adjusting its disclosure strategy. As
disclosure of nonearnings information is optional, managers could selectively disclose it to
shareholders. Insider trading is an effective indicator of manager’s personal profit from this
information advantage. Therefore, we set a dummy variable Top_ETRANS for top 10%
ETRANS stocks and introduce INSIRETURNi;t variable to capture the potential abnormal profit
from the transaction and a dummy variable Top_ETRANS*INSIRETURNi;t to identify the
stocks of both high ETRANS and high insider trading profit. We then perform regression
analysis to investigate the impact of extremely high earnings transparency interacted with
high insider trading profit on crash risk. If our prediction is correct, we expect to see the
positive regression coefficient of this interaction variable.
Reported results in Table 6 are in line with our expectations. The Top_ETRANS group
still shows significant negative relation with NCSKEW and CRASH at 1 and 5% significance
levels, respectively. However, the INSIRETURNi;t is positively related to NCSKEWat 1% level of
significance. Meanwhile, the interaction variable of Top_ETRANS and INSIRETURNi;t is
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problem is severe, the high earnings transparency could actually indicate the absence of
nonearnings information, which ultimately results in crash risk.
5. Conclusions
Using a sample of listed Chinese stocks during the 2006–2013 period, we show that earnings
quality is strongly associatedwith stock price crash risk as hypothesized in finance literature.
Confirming the implicit assumptionmade by previous studies, we provide empirical evidence
that earnings management significantly increases the crash risk in China, whereas earnings
transparency (not studied in Chinese context before) reduces the crash risk. However, with
the strong presence of agency issues and active insider trading activities in China, we raise a
concern that the negative relation between earnings transparency and crash risk may be
spurious and may require further investigation. We argue that extreme transparency
(measured by the extent of explanatory power of earnings numbers on stock return) may
facilitate insiders to conceal bad news and thus increase the likelihood of stock price crash
over time. Our further empirical test supports this conjecture.
Our study implies that the twometrics for earnings quality: earnings management degree
and earnings transparency are not completely interchangeable. Different from earnings
management degree (which is measured using accounting data), earnings transparency is an
indirect earnings quality indicator from the information user’s perspective. We need to be
cautiouswhen using it as an explanatory variable of stock price crash risk (or even ametric of
earnings quality for other empirical purposes) in an emerging market such as China.
Notes
1. Trading halts during Chinese stock market crashes in 2015 are believed to spread fear and panic
among Chinese individual investors even further.
2. There has been no study relating earnings transparency to stock price crash risk in China.
3. Other categories of determinants of crash risk including factors related to managerial incentives and
characteristics, capital market transactions, corporate governance mechanisms and informal
institutional mechanisms. See a review of literature in Habib et al. (2018).





Top_ETRANS 0.0665*** (0.026) 0.0200** (0.009)
Top_ETRANS*INSIRETURNi;t 0.0443** (0.035) 0.0156 (0.013)
INSIRETURNi;t 0.0278*** (0.009) 0.0004 (0.003)
NCSKEWi;t 0.0553*** (0.011) 0.0016 (0.004)
MBi,t 0.0171*** (0.002) 0.0034*** (0.001)
SIGMAi,t 2.079*** (0.536) 0.872*** (0.198)
LEVi,t (10
–3) 0.0005 (0.345) 0.0003** (0.127)
ROAi,t (10
–3) (10–3) 0.293*** (0.113) 0.0013 (0.042)
RETURNi,t 0.318*** (0.032) 0.0301** (0.012)
DTURNi,t (10
–3) (10–3) 0.0055 (0.022) 0.0105 (0.008)
SIZEi,t 0.0130* (0.007) 0.0029 (0.002)
Constant 0.580*** (0.112) 0.0696* (0.041)
Observations 11,030 11,030
R-squared 0.024 0.006






5. For brevity, we do not report the results of DUVOL. They are available upon request.
6. We calculate Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to confirm that multicollinearity is not too harmful in
our regression models.
7. All results in our study are largely robust to the inclusion of “industry” fixed effect.
8. For brevity, the regression results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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